On Romanticising Violence

Much of the left has an emotional attachment to a myth of romantic insurrection. It’s by no means alone in this. Liberalism has its own mythical narratives of glorified violence too and of course all state regimes are founded on acts of violence – whether these are celebrated in sanitised mythical form (Bastille Day, Independence Day…) or sublimated and disavowed. I’m no pacifist. I’m as violent as the next person, as are you. Sometimes it’s unavoidable. Sometimes it is better than the alternatives. Sometimes it’s necessary. But if it is, it’s a tragic necessity (and it must have limits). Don’t romanticise it. The ‘rage of the people’ looks like those pictures of bloodied young conscript soldiers in Istanbul cowering from the blows of the crowd. It’s boys being lynched. It’s sordid, cruel, nasty, demeaning. Look it in the face. Grow up.

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The Left After Leave

Edited version of the post below now up at Jacobin.

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The Brexit Disaster

In a debate that was, from the beginning, dominated on both sides by the right there was only ever going to be one winner in last week’s referendum on British membership of the European Union – the right.

Given that the original decision to call the referendum was intended as a political maneuver on the part of David Cameron to outflank a hard-right insurgency from the United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) the basic coordinates of the debate were never in much doubt. This was always, in effect, a debate structured as an internecine contest within and among the right over issues identified and framed in largely right of center, neoliberal terms.

On the one hand the mainstream Remain camp cohered a range of political forces under the hegemony of the ‘moderate’ Cameron wing of the Tories and leading sections of capital. On the other, Leave organized a motley alliance of forces under the domination of the Tory hard right and Ukip.

Operating on a political terrain not of its own making, in a struggle in which major camps on both sides were dragooned under the leadership of opposed factions of the right, it was predictable that the left would exert little influence over the key terms of the contest.

Any realistic assessment on the part of the radical left of the likely consequences of a victory for either side had to conclude that neither a victory for Remain nor for Leave would constitute a positive outcome. The real question was not so much which side we should want to win, but which of them we should desire most to lose.

For many of us, except a small band of Left Exit (“Lexit”) campaigners, it was very clear which of the two was the least worst option. For while Remain promised little other than business as usual (neoliberalism, austerity, ‘sensible controls on immigration’) under the aegis of continued membership of the EU, Leave represented something much darker and more dangerous.

In the end the worst worst option emerged victorious.

We have to be absolutely clear about this and indeed about how bad things now are. The Brexit vote is a major triumph for forces of national chauvinism, xenophobia, racism and the hard right. As such it is a catastrophe for workers – particularly immigrant workers – and the left.

Much media commentary interprets the vote in terms of an anti-establishment uprising – an expression of disaffection and anger at the status quo on the part of alienated, poorer sections of society. The Lexit left insists, along similar lines but with a Marxist inflection, that the referendum result represents a ‘rebellion by working class people’ against neoliberalism and austerity.

There’s certainly something to this analysis. Leave does seem to have won the support of a large segment of the poorest sections of society and indeed was able to tap a deep well of anti-establishment resentment among the working class born out of many years of growing class and regional inequality, deindustrialization, structural unemployment, ever increasing levels of job insecurity and so on. That Leave – headed up by figures such as Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage who aren’t exactly strangers to social and economic privilege -was able to channel such grievances reflects the key weakness of the Remain campaign.

In an age of anti-political populism, Remain’s ability to cohere all major political party leaderships (with the partial exception of a semi-detached Jeremy Corbyn), much of big business, a large tranche of the “great and the good” from the world of culture and entertainment and to attract the vocal support of powerful international politicians and technocrats – from Jean Claude Juncker to Barack Obama – turned out to be much more of a liability than a strength. It was almost as if Remain’s core strategy was to present itself as the voice of UK and international political and economic elites closing ranks. It was punished accordingly.

But although there was a significant anti-establishment component to the Leave vote we should reject the idea that the vote – and the lines of social cleavage that it expressed and revealed – can be adequately interpreted as some sort of working class revolt. There are two reasons for this.

The first is that the most advanced demographic analysis of the vote that we yet have to hand – the Ashcroft poll – doesn’t bear this out. The poll draws on one of the standard UK measures of social class, distributing voters into a class hierarchy measured in terms of occupational category.

The proponents of the “working class revolt” thesis make much of the fact that, according to the Ashcroft figures, a majority of AB voters – those in the top tier of occupations – voted Remain and a majority of voters from the lowest categories – C2 and DE – voted Leave. Needless to say, however, occupational category measures of social stratification do not operate on the basis of a Marxist understanding of class. Indeed, as Charlie Hore points out:

AB includes 25 percent of the population, including key groups of workers who have been in struggle recently–teachers, nurses, doctors and other health professions–and, in fact, most trade union members.

In addition, the DE figures are skewed by the fact that this category includes pensioners (some rich, some poor), among whom there was a very large turnout.

Further, the Ashcroft figures show us that 73% of 18 to 24 year-old voters and 62% of 25-34s chose Remain while “a majority of those aged over 45 voted to leave, rising to 60% of those aged 65 or over” – suggesting that, in fact age, rather than income or class was one of the key determinants of this ballot.

The statistics on voter choice by race and ethnicity are also striking. They show that while 53% of white voters voted chose Leave “Two thirds (67%) of those describing themselves as Asian voted to remain, as did three quarters (73%) of black voters” and that “seven in ten Muslims voted to remain”.

The regional and geographical breakdown of the vote does little back up the idea of a “working class uprising” either. All major cities with the exception of Birmingham voted to Remain. All districts in Scotland and nationalist areas of Northern Ireland – areas that encompass pockets of major deprivation – voted solidly to Remain as did the vast majority of London boroughs, including those containing high levels of poverty such as Lambeth and Hackney (79% and 78% Remain respectively).

So all in all as Hore remarks:

It’s an odd “working-class revolt” that doesn’t include Scotland, West Belfast, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Bristol, London, most union members, most Black and minority ethnic voters, and three-quarters of young voters.

The second major reason to reject the idea that the Brexit vote represents a popular rebellion to be celebrated and supported is that, whatever, the demographic profile of this “revolt”, what should matter just as much to socialists is its specific political character. There are of course populisms of the left and the right – it is absurd to imagine that all such political movements are inherently progressive or conceal within themselves somehow a fundamentally socialist dynamic.

So we should ask: what is the concrete political content of this ‘uprising’ – what political and social forces are hegemonic within it and along what lines have they channeled wider popular discontent?

It’s quite clear in this respect that the forces now riding the crest of the Leave victory are hard right forces in the Conservative party and beyond. Their strategic achievement was, as Richard Seymour puts it, to have,

successfully articulated a broad antiestablishment sentiment — originating in class injuries, regional decline, postindustrial devastation, generational anxieties, etc. — along bigoted, national chauvinist lines.

In particular, the Leave side focused relentlessly on immigration conducting one of the most sickeningly racist and xenophobic electoral campaigns ever seen in Britain. Effectively they transformed the referendum into a plebiscite by proxy on immigration.

Clear indication of this can be seen in the Ashcroft poll which reveals that a third of Leave voters said the main reason for their choice was that Brexit “offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders.” It is also possible to deduce from the figures we saw above on the distribution of votes among black and ethnic minority voters that the large majority of non-white voters were quite aware of the way in which the Leave campaign pivoted on the question of race.

This isn’t to say that everyone who voted for Leave was racist or anti-immigrant or that the vote did not express dissatisfaction about a range of legitimate issues – but this was, in effect, the core “meaning” that the Leave campaign successfully conferred on the referendum and which was well understood by many Leave and Remain voters alike. As Seymour comments:

The vote cannot be reduced to racism and nationalism — but that is the primary way in which it has been organised and recruited and directed, and that is the primary way in which the outcome will be experienced.

Indeed, sadly – but utterly predictably – there seems to have been a major spike in the number of reported racist attacks and hate crimes since the Brexit victory. The UK news currently overflows with such stories: xenophobic graffiti scrawled across the doors of a West London Polish community center; a man on a rush hour Manchester tram told to “go back to Africa”; laminated cards with the words “Leave the EU – no more Polish vermin” delivered to the houses of Polish families in Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire; a muslim girl cornered by a group in Birmingham and told “Get out we voted leave”. These are just a small selection of the reported incidents since the vote last Thursday – and reported incidents, of course, are likely to be the mere tip of the iceberg.

On Monday a student with a Portuguese passport came to my office, obviously in a high state of agitation, and told me that she doesn’t want to stay in a country where she and her family “are not welcome”. Many similar conversations will have taken place in universities, colleges, workplaces and among friends, families and between partners up and down the UK in the past few days. Britain has become a frightening place to be a foreigner and many immigrant people can see the referendum result clearly for what it is – the harbinger of intensified racism and xenophobia and indeed a political mandate for the hard right to ratchet up anti-immigrant rhetoric and anti-immigrant policies.

An atmosphere of tension, uncertainty and indeed fear has descended on the country since the vote. There’s a real sense that the threat of serious violence and civil unrest is simmering just under the surface, waiting to erupt. Everyone can feel it. In no small part this is because every racist, every far right group, got a major psychological boost from the Brexit result – they feel their time has come.

Though intensified xenophobia is the main determinant of the heightened anxiety throughout British society currently, there is another source too. The signs of an imminent plunge back into serious economic recession will have escaped the notice of very few. The day after the vote Sterling fell off a cliff in the money markets and stock markets went into turmoil. Foreign investment in Britain is widely expected to fall, as is GDP growth and it’s widely suspected that many multinational corporations who were drawn to Britain as a stepping stone into the wider EU market are considering winding down their British operations.

Of course the interests of labor and capital are not synonymous – and not all of this will be bad news for those who can’t afford current house prices for example – but neither are they counter-posed in some zero-sum relationship. The structural power of capital after all pivots on the fact that under capitalism wage labor is dependent on the social class that exploits it for jobs, investment, availability of consumer goods in the shops and so on. A recession for capital is also a recession for workers – more so, in fact, given that workers and the poor always bear the brunt of restructuring and readjustment for the recovery of profits.

Already the Chancellor, George Osborne, has indicated that Brexit means more cuts, more austerity. Again, everyone knows this. Everyone can feel it coming. Most know too, that the insurgent hard right have a vision of Britain as a “neoliberal fantasy island”, more extreme than Cameron and Osborne were willing to conceive.

Of course, not everything is going swimmingly for Leave. Many have noted that Johnson and other Tories on the Leave side have looked strangely subdued in the aftermath of the referendum result (compare this with Farage’s sinister gloating and braying in the European Parliament) – as if they realize, in the context of the economic instability Brexit has unleashed and the apparent unwillingness of EU elites to make things easy for British withdrawal with an amicable deal, that they have just been handed a poisoned chalice.

Already we see signs of Leave backtracking on issues like free movement and exiting the single market. The danger here, however, is that if and when whoever takes the reins from Cameron fails to fully to deliver on Leave’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and on the British Empire-redux fantasies about remaking the country as a powerhouse of global trade, the forces poised to take advantage of mass disappointment are forces even further to the right – Ukip or perhaps even something much nastier currently lurking in the shadows.

Though the Tories certainly have their problems at the moment, they are nothing compared to the civil war now raging in the Labour party. According to the Lexit narrative Brexit would split the Conservatives and propel Corbyn into power. But this simply isn’t happening. The Labour right have seized the opportunity provided by the defeat of Remain to launch a serious and sustained bid to unseat Corbyn.

Given Corbyn’s determination to stay in place as leader and his continuing popularity among the party membership it seems likely that this bid will fail, at least in the short term. But it’s clear that the Rubicon has been crossed by the Labour right – they can’t go back now – and if they can’t get rid of Corbyn immediately, they will seek to grind him down, and if they can’t do that before the next election they will seek to wreck the chances of a Labour victory to make a self-fulfilling prophecy of their claim that Corbyn is “unelectable”.

This – the collapse of Labour, not the Tories – is one of the greatest political legacies of the referendum result.

So what must the radical left seek to do in these bleak circumstances? What can we feasibly aim to achieve?

A priority for the section of the British far left that continues to delude itself about ‘Lexit’ – and indeed for those sections of the international left that indulged this fantasy – must be to look reality in the face. There is no Lexit on the cards. There never was. What we face now is serious growth in officially sanctioned racism and anti-immigrant prejudice, the embedding of reactionary discourse within the political mainstream, drawing strength from a mobilized reactionary populism, the immediate prospect of deepened austerity and the implosion of the Labour party. We are not on the offensive. The referendum was not a victory for us. We are, on the contrary, very much on the defensive.

Our practical priorities in terms of mobilization and campaigning must be to work to defend migrants – a small beginning has been made in this respect already, but we will need to do much more and it will need to be sustained for the long term. A second practical priority must be to do what we can to defend Corbyn. I don’t hold out much hope for a Corbyn victory in the next General Election, but his continuing leadership is all that stands between having a Labour party that stands for the defense of immigrants and one which, on the basis of political expediency follows (and thus reinforces) the political drift to the right in the name of “legitimate concerns about immigration” and so on.

Some on the left hope for a second referendum or for some sort of legal-constitutional blocking of Brexit by the Scottish government. These developments may, indeed, yet happen – and, of course, the EU is no stranger to rerunning referendums (or ignoring them) until it gets the “right result”. But it would be a big mistake for the left to give its backing to such maneuvers. It would look like the worst kind of anti-democratic manipulation and – in the context of the diffuse anti-establishment feeling discussed above – hugely counter-productive.

Besides, we don’t hope for salvation from above. Our primary focus has to be on mobilization from below. We must start with defensive measures to hold off the racists and keep Corbyn at the head of the Labour party for as long as we can and hope for the tide to turn. I don’t think our chances are good. The odds are against us. But then again, they always are – perhaps some comfort can be taken from this.

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Jacobin: Socialists and the EU Referendum

There’s a whole series of interesting articles and interviews on the EU referendum on Jacobin – includes contributions from Richard Seymour, Neil Davidson and David Renton. The series includes my article ‘There is No Left Exit’

Worth a look.

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Lexit: “Optimism” isn’t enough

Neil Davidson’s argument for Lexit in the US Socialist Worker is a sophisticated one (of course it is, it’s Neil Davidson). Unlike most of the other Lexit arguments I’ve seen Davidson doesn’t seek merely to bash us over the head with a series of leftist truisms about the structures and practices of the EU (it’s capitalist (oh noes!), neoliberal, undemocratic… ) and takes left Remainers seriously – allowing that they may actually be aware of these things too.

Neil rightly identifies the left Remain argument as, essentially, a ‘lesser evil’ position. The most interesting part of his article is when he takes this on. But I’m not very convinced by what he says. His argument is, basically, that the ‘lesser evil’ argument is fatalist and ‘pessimistic’; that it ignores genuine anti-ruling class grievances among working class Leavers who might be won to a progressive struggle (i.e. Lexit) and with whom the left must seek to engage; that it reduces migrants to a ‘passive status’ rather than individuals and communities with agency and the ability to resist; that in any case British capital needs migrant labour and so is unlikely to implement draconian anti-migrant measures; that the left Remain argument puts us in hock to the EU as a saviour and tends to slide into apologia for that institution.

It seems to be one of the hallmarks of contemporary revolutionary polemic to refer to the “pessimism” of ones’ opponents. But of course one person’s “pessimism” is another person’s sober, worldly realism and as a form of argument it seems to me to rely on a sort of theological moralism – where what really seems to matter is the intensity of *faith* of the person in question and where this belief is assumed to have some sort of magical casual connection with the concrete salience of your politics. The “pessimism” of left Remainers, for me, seems to be absolutely indispensable. What it is, in my view, is simply a clear-sighted assessment of the prevailing balance of social and political forces in this referendum and of the likely consequences of a Leave vote, given these circumstances.

Neil seems to agree that the Leave campaign is dominated by hard right forces – but is able to dismiss the conclusions we draw on the basis of “optimism” (though he doesn’t use that term). But isn’t “optimism” the fatuous inverse of “pessimism” – magical thinking, voluntarism, self-deception? And I think there is something facile about the argument about migrants having the agency to resist persecution – as if we should think ‘Oh well, ok then, bring on the Johnson-Farage government because it’ll be no match for Polish trade unionists’. And I’m just not convinced by the argument that given how much migrant workers are needed by British businesses, there are unlikely to be any major consequences for foreign nationals working in Britain. As Pete Green suggested in his debate with Joseph Choonara, this kind of argument is a “crudely economistic, politically naïve claim” that fails to take seriously the relative autonomy of politics and the way in which political discourse can have serious concrete effects. It’s certainly the case that many EU migrants in Britain are decidedly anxious about the prospect of a Leave victory and indeed, it’s worth pointing out that the potential victims of any political consolidation of anti-immigrant feeling via a vote for Brexit go far beyond their number (about 2 million) to encompass all migrants (EU or not) and further, anyone who isn’t white – because, of course, an anti-immigrant climate is also a climate of generalized racism.

Lexiteers seem to me not to take seriously the extent to which the Brexit camp is hegemonised by the hard right. It’s true that there may well be potentially progressive strands of grievance among Leavers that could in principle be articulated into a left wing project. Of course it’s true. But the fact is that the forces of Lexit are tiny and overwhelmed by the forces of the right. It may be “pessimistic” to say this, but it seems to me a sober statement of fact, that the Lexit campaign while having some degree of traction among the diminished circles of the far left and its ‘periphery’ (enough perhaps to swing the vote in a closely contested referendum – currently 50/50 according to John Curtice’s poll of polls) it has next to no visibility among the broader constituencies it is seeking to cohere. The idea, for me, that Lexit can somehow reorient Brexit away from its current political trajectory – can transform it into its political opposite – just seems to me to be wishful thinking. It’s often rightly said by left Remainers that Lexiteers need to engage with the actually existing referendum campaign, not the one in their collective imagination. The hard right have effectively turned this referendum into a vote on migration. We know that the meaning of any vote cannot be seen in abstraction from the prevailing political and ideological discourses that frame it. It’s just not a referendum about neoliberalism or capitalism or fortress Europe – it *is* on the contrary about ‘fortress Britain”.

And Neil’s comments about the tendency for left Remain arguments to slide into apologia for the EU have to be seen in this context. This is, indeed, a danger and for what it’s worth I think there is a tendency to paint a rather too rosy picture of the EU among some in the left Remain camp. But there’s an opposite danger too – that, given the prevailing balance of forces on Leave, Lexiteers will be “pulled” closer into the orbit of the right. Indeed, up until the murder of Jo Cox at least I often encountered a sort of defensiveness from Lexit acquaintances when I mentioned the racism of the official Leave campaign. I noticed a sort of awkward, reactive desire to play down the racism and anti-migrant politics being stoked by Leave. Even though it was pointed out that Lexit has nothing to do with Vote Leave – organisationally, ideologically, politically – there was still this weird desire to counter the suggestion that the official Brexit campaign is as nasty as it is or to argue that the Remain one is just as bad. I’m not suggesting for one minute that Lexiteers would ever apologise for racism or scapegoating. But there are dangers in seeking to play down or pretend not to have seen the ugly forces that have been released by Brexit.

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A vote for Leave is a vote for the political forces dominant in the Leave camp

I’ve just got round to reading Giles Fraser’s recent opinion piece in the Guardian on the EU referendum which I noticed had been shared quite a bit on social media. I like Giles Fraser very much. He came to prominence as a figure on the British left as canon chancellor of St Paul’s at the time of Occupy LSX, providing public support for the protesters camping outside the cathedral – and indeed he resigned from this position when it became clear that the governing body of St Paul’s would not oppose the use of force in the eviction of the camp. Since then, he’s gone on to carve out a niche for himself as a media commentator, appearing regularly on Radio 4, BBC 1’s Question Time and as a columnist in the Guardian. Indeed I’m an avid reader of Fraser’s ‘loose canon’ column – there’s something I find very attractive about his CofE leftism.

In recent months Fraser has emerged as an eloquent, leftist voice for Brexit and indeed seems to have come in for a fair bit of stick for it. His recent column laments the abusive and poisonous tone of much of the debate about the referendum – particularly on social media it seems – and reaffirms Fraser’s conviction that, in view of the undemocratic and neoliberal structures and practices of the EU, the left has good reason to back leave rather than remain.

I agree and disagree with Fraser. I agree, of course, that there are principled progressive people in both camps with principled progressive reasons for their choice. I agree, too, that in many ways the EU is a horrible institution. But I disagree with this, the crux of Fraser’s argument: “It’s not who you vote with – it’s what you vote for”. This pithy phrase seems to me to encapsulate a core assumption in the Left Exit camp’s reasoning – the assumption that Lexit operates somehow on a completely separate plane of existence from the wider Leave campaign. Lexit does, of course, campaign separately from Vote Leave and organisationally, ideologically, politically has nothing in common with the anti-migrant dog whistlers like Johnson and Farage in the mainstream Leave camp. Nothing in common, at least, other than the fact that supporters of Lexit and Brexit will both place a cross in the same box on the ballot paper on 23rd June and that these votes will be amalgamated into the same mass when they are counted, with no distinction between them. That’s actually, in the end, quite an important commonality. There is no Lexit option on the ballot paper.

So the trouble with Fraser’s phrase (and this for me is what the necessity to vote Remain pivots on) is that there is, in fact, no airtight seal between ‘what you vote for’ and ‘who you vote with’. It’s not adequate to appeal to your good intentions – to say that what you mean by your vote is specifically x, y or z – ballots don’t register subjective preferences with any such nuance. What matters in this referendum are the likely political consequences of a victory for either camp and this depends crucially on the manner in which a victory for either side is likely to be interpreted – the likely features of the political mandate that will be asserted in the aftermath of the counting of votes. This will pivot on the balance of political forces within each camp overall – specifically on the question of which of these are hegemonic and have most effectively been able to shape the key terms at stake in the referendum. Because, of course,  the referendum (like any other vote) is not some sort of abstract, static question hovering above the dynamic process of political struggle. It can’t be understood in abstraction from the political context that frames and shapes it.

So what you’re voting for is absolutely bound up with the question of who you’re voting with – more specifically, it’s bound up with the question of what forces are dominant among those with whom you’ll vote. It is pretty clear that the dominant forces in the Leave campaign (and let’s not beat around the bush here – the tiny constellation of left groups pushing Lexit are, sadly, totally marginal in the national debate) have, with the collusion of substantial sections of the press, in effect turned the referendum into a plebiscite on immigration. This is what’s at stake. The choice is between a bad outcome (the UK remaining a member of an undemocratic, neoliberal, ‘Fortress Europe’) and an absolutely terrible one (a neoliberal, ‘Fortress little Britain’, in which the hard right have the upper hand and and plausibly claim a mandate to ramp up the persecution of migrants).

Lexit supporters need to think seriously about the likely political consequences of a victory for Leave. They need to start thinking soberly about the referendum that’s actually taking place and not the one that really only exists in their imagination. This imperative to think honestly and with realism goes for Left Remain too, of course – and I’ve written previously about my doubts in relation to the idea of ‘democratising the EU’. But the likely consequences of a Leave vote in current circumstances in this world, rather than in the parallel universe of Lexit, seem to me to be much much worse than the likely bad consequences of a victory for Remain.

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Another Europe is Unlikely, but that’s no reason to vote Leave

I intend to vote Remain in the forthcoming referendum on the UK’s EU membership and as a lefty, of course, I gravitate toward the Another Europe is Possible (AEiP) campaign rather than the generally awful mainstream Britain Stronger In Europe campaign – that simultaneously grotesque and incredibly tedious lash-up of Tories, Lib Dems, right-leaning Labour figures and multinational CEOs trumpeting their ‘patriotic arguments’ for Britain’s EU membership. I have to say though, that while basically a supporter of AEiP, I’m not particularly convinced by arguments emanating from that camp in relation to the possibility of transforming EU institutions in a leftist direction.

Writing for AEiP, Hilary Wainwright and Mary Kaldor articulate one of the clearest arguments for a strategy of leftwing reform of the EU in their essay ‘So You Think the EU Can’t be Reformed?’.  The thrust of their argument boils down to a vision of the EU as a basically neutral institutional terrain that neoliberalism currently dominates on a merely contingent basis. I think they do hit on something when they imply that there’s something crudely ‘essentialist’ about the ‘Left Exit’ (Lexit) argument – or, actually, the assertion as it’s never fully explicated – that the EU is absolutely unreformable because of something or another inherent in its DNA. Actually, as Wainwright and Kaldor argue the EU – like any institutional complex – is a constantly battled-over terrain of struggle and never inherently or absolutely one thing or another. Indeed precisely because it’s a ‘project’ rather than a ‘finished’ and stable set of institutions the EU, constantly in a state of becoming, is a particularly contested site of contestation. We know for example that different national states joined this project for different reasons and projected their own particular class inflected national imaginaries onto it. Some of these had concrete institutional effects beyond mere interpretation. We know that key architects of the European project (as Wainwright and Kaldor point out) such as Jean Monnet seem to have been driven by a genuinely internationalist and cosmopolitan vision of a future ‘United States of Europe’ that was born out of the destruction and killing of WW2 and the determination that this should never be allowed to happen again – and we know that this really was a motivating force driving the early construction of European institutions, at least to some extent. We know that the EU is traversed by conflicting ‘supranational’, ‘federalist’ and ‘intergovernmental’ logics – the institutional matrix as a whole expressing all of these things simultaneously. It is a body that is constantly pulled and pushed in different directions. It is many things at the same time but never fully any of them.

But what Wainwright and Kaldor downplay or miss is the necessary structural predominance of particular logics/interests. It seems to me revealing that they refer merely to the domination of ‘corporations’ and banks as the apparent explanation of the less pleasant facets of EU policy rather than ‘capital’ – or indeed ‘capitalism’ – as if there is nothing systemic about the pressures exerted on and within these institutions or the all pervading context in which it is rooted and grows out of. While the EU bears in some ways the traces of Monnet-type cosmopolitan optimism – at the very least rhetorically in the trumpeted ideological self-image of the ‘project’- this is certainly not a dominant logic. As the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions at the European level as Poulantzas might have pointed out – though a particularly indirect, second-order condensation, filtered and refracted first through national condensations of relations of social force – the EU is absolutely and inseparably bound up with national and trans-national capitalist accumulation imperatives and strategies (how could it be otherwise?)

They miss, too, the way in which the structures and practices of the EU manifest and express the unequal power of particular member states – the power of some states over others and relatedly the (super?)exploitative power of particular national capitals over foreign economies. In addition they overlook (given for example the huge power of the unelected European Commission, the virtually ornamental function of the European Parliament and indeed the absence of a European demos to speak of) the way in which EU institutions are relatively insulated from popular pressures in a way that national states are not and cannot be if they are to maintain their popular legitimacy – and indeed the way in which the EU might well function, partially, as a bolster to national state legitimacy, taking responsibility for neoliberal reforms ‘imposed from without’ that can be disavowed by the state elites that helped draw them up in the first place. So, while it’s got to be true that the EU can be reformed, there are structurally embedded limits to any possible social democratic/leftist reforms and they’ll be extraordinarily difficult to push very far.

The pro-Remain left is on weak ground, in my view, when it campaigns on the basis of a vision of a transformed, progressive, leftish EU. I think the strongest arguments for Left Remain lie elsewhere – not least in the evident delusions of Lexit. Our argument should pivot on an assessment of the political and social balance of forces at play here in the UK, and to a lesser extent those across the continent, and the simple observation that the actually existing Brexit campaign is dominated by particularly reactionary and dangerous arguments, ideas and political forces – and that, as such, Lexit is simply not on the agenda. This is, unfortunately, a ‘lesser evil’ argument. But that’s the reality.

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